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CROSS-BORDER CORRUPTION ENFORCEMENT: 
A CASE FOR MEASURED COORDINATION 
AMONG MULTIPLE 
ENFORCEMENT AUTHORITIES 
Jay Holtmeier* 
INTRODUCTION 
The steady increase in cooperation and information sharing among 
governments is a trend commonly noted in discussions of current 
anticorruption enforcement.1  There is no shortage of evidence to support 
this observation.  In 2013 and 2014 alone, the Department of Justice (DOJ) 
and Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) recognized the 
cooperation and assistance of foreign law enforcement authorities in at least 
twenty-three actions brought under the U.S. Foreign Corrupt Practices Act 
(FCPA or “the Act”).2  U.S. enforcement authorities—once the world’s 
primary anticorruption enforcers—increasingly can and do rely on the help 
of their international counterparts and are pursuing more investigations that 
run concurrently with, or in the wake of, investigations initiated by foreign 
authorities.3 
This increase in cross-border information sharing and enforcement is 
unsurprising given that a growing number of countries are entering the 
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Parker and Erin G.H. Sloane and special counsel Lillian Howard Potter for their many 
insights and their collaboration.  The author also thanks senior associates Rebecca Ann 
Haciski, Katie Moran, and Jennifer M. Rimm and associate Jared B. Cohen for their tireless 
and thoughtful contributions.  This Article is part of a symposium entitled Fighting 
Corruption in America and Abroad held at Fordham University School of Law.  For an 
overview of the symposium, see Jed Handelsman Shugerman, Foreword:  Fighting 
Corruption in America and Abroad, 84 FORDHAM L. REV. 407 (2015). 
 
 1. See, e.g., WILMERHALE LLP, GLOBAL ANTI-BRIBERY YEAR-IN-REVIEW:  2014 
DEVELOPMENTS AND PREDICTIONS FOR 2015 20–22 (2015), https://www.wilmerhale.com/ 
uploadedFiles/Shared_Content/Editorial/Publications/WH_Publications/Client_Alert_PDfs/F
CPA%20YIR%20Alert_01%2027%2015.pdf [http://perma.cc/EJG5-WJQ9]; Robb Adkins & 
Benjamin Kimberley, The Globalization of Anti-Corruption Enforcement:  Recent Trends 
and Developments, in INTERNATIONAL WHITE COLLAR ENFORCEMENT 87, 108 (2014). 
 2. See generally Justice News, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, http://www.justice.gov/justice-
news (last visited Oct. 21, 2015) [http://perma.cc/Q33E-DXN9]; Press Releases, SEC, 
http://www.sec.gov/news/pressreleases (last visited Oct. 21, 2015) [http://perma.cc/99CK-
66AZ].  This count includes only cases where the DOJ or SEC publicly and affirmatively 
acknowledged such cooperation; the true number of cases resolved with the cooperation of 
foreign authorities is probably greater. 
 3. See WILMERHALE LLP, supra note 1. 
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anticorruption fray as independent players, either by passing antibribery 
laws or by stepping up enforcement of existing laws.4  Of the forty-one 
present members of the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and 
Development (OECD) Convention on Combating Bribery of Foreign Public 
Officials in International Business Transactions (“OECD Convention” or 
“the Convention”), which requires state signatories to implement legislation 
criminalizing bribery of foreign public officials,5 only twenty member 
states had such laws on the books at the time the Convention came into 
force in 1999—the other twenty-one have passed such legislation since 
then.6  The number of non-U.S. enforcement actions concerning bribery of 
foreign officials has more than doubled since 2012, and, in 2014, for the 
first time, such actions outnumbered U.S. enforcement actions.7  The 
United Kingdom has recently become an active prosecutor of foreign 
bribery, passing the U.K. Bribery Act in 2010 and playing an increasingly 
aggressive and effective role in enforcement through its Serious Fraud 
Office8 (SFO). 
Enforcement in other countries has followed a similar trajectory, and not 
only in the developed Western world.  In mid-2013, Brazil entered the 
foreign anticorruption arena with the enactment of the Clean Company Act, 
which prohibits bribery of foreign officials by companies that operate in 
Brazil as well as by their affiliates around the world.9  In 2015, Brazil filed 
charges against nearly forty individuals in connection with investigations of 
corruption at Petroleo Brasileiro S.A. (“Petrobras”), a Brazilian energy 
company, and Embraer S.A., a Brazilian aircraft manufacturer—both of 
which are also reportedly under investigation in the United States for FCPA 
violations.10 
China, another relatively new player in the anticorruption enforcement 
arena, amended its corruption law in 2011, making it illegal to bribe 
government officials overseas in an effort to secure “improper” commercial 
benefits.11  In 2014, Chinese authorities made headlines by fining the 
 
 4. Gwendolyn L. Hassan, The Increasing Risk of Multijurisdictional Bribery 
Prosecution:  Why Having an FCPA Compliance Program Is No Longer Enough, 42 INT’L 
L. NEWS 12, 14–15 (2013). 
 5. Convention on Combating Bribery of Foreign Public Officials in International 
Business Transactions art. 1, Dec. 18, 1997, 37 I.L.M. 1 (1998) [hereinafter OECD 
Convention]. 
 6. See ORG. FOR ECON. COOPERATION & DEV. [OECD], OECD FOREIGN BRIBERY 
REPORT:  AN ANALYSIS OF THE CRIME OF BRIBERY OF FOREIGN PUBLIC OFFICIALS 11 (2014). 
 7. TRACE INT’L, INC., GLOBAL ENFORCEMENT REPORT 2014 8 (2015). 
 8. See id. at 6–7; Corruption by Country:  United Kingdom, TRANSPARENCY 
INTERNATIONAL, http://www.transparency.org/country/#GBR_Overview (last visited Oct. 21, 
2015) [http://perma.cc/MWY3-DG8M]. 
 9. Decreto No. 12.846, de 1 del Augusto de 2013, DIÁRIO OFICIAL DA UNIÃO [D.O.U.] 
de 2.08.2013 (Braz.). 
 10. Trace Compendium, TRACE INT’L, https://www.traceinternational2.org/compendium 
(search entries for “Petroleo Brasileiro SA” and “Embraer”) (last visited Oct. 21, 2015) 
[hereinafter Trace Compendium] [http://perma.cc/S9BV-HZWB]. 
 11. Zhong hua ren min gong he guo xing fa xiu zheng an (ba) 
(中华人民共和国刑法修正案(八)) [Eighth Amendment to the Criminal Law of the 
People’s Republic of China] (promulgated by the Standing Comm. Nat’l People’s Cong., 
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Chinese subsidiary of British pharmaceutical company GlaxoSmithKline 
plc (GSK) a record three billion yuan (approximately $489 million) for 
allegedly bribing doctors to prescribe GSK drugs.12  In addition to bringing 
criminal charges against GSK, Chinese authorities brought criminal charges 
against five individuals, including former GSK China executive Mark 
Reilly and four other managers, all of whom received prison sentences.13  
U.S. authorities, who are also reportedly investigating GSK,14 have not 
taken action at this time. 
As these and other foreign authorities increasingly investigate and 
proscribe bribery, concurrent investigations and prosecutions by multiple 
countries, once considered a “trend,” will become a fixture in the global 
anticorruption enforcement landscape.  In some sense, this outcome is 
precisely what the United States and anticorruption organizations such as 
the OECD and Transparency International (TI) have advocated for many 
years:  with multiple countries starting to pull their weight in efforts to root 
out and punish corrupt practices, the international community is moving 
toward developing a coordinated effort to deter bribery in international 
business.15  As more and more countries enter the anticorruption 
enforcement arena, however, it will become increasingly common that one 
incident of alleged misconduct will trigger years of parallel or successive 
enforcement actions and, in some cases, duplicative penalties by different 
authorities.  When overlapping jurisdiction exists, and countries proceed in 
isolation, what can result is an unfair, unpredictable, and overly punitive 
regime that, in the long run, may prove counterproductive. 
This Article takes stock of how international anticorruption enforcement 
authorities have addressed these issues and makes proposals for reducing 
the potential adverse effects of multijurisdictional prosecutions.  Part I 
provides an overview of multinational antibribery enforcement efforts.  Part 
II discusses different approaches to multinational enforcement that 
authorities have taken to date.  These approaches suggest that some degree 
of coordination with respect to resolutions is the norm, although how and 
the extent to which different enforcers cooperate with one another varies 
widely. 
 
Feb. 25, 2011, effective May 1, 2011), http://en.pkulaw.cn/display.aspx?cgid=145719&lib= 
law [http://perma.cc/6FHJ-UBSF]. 
 12. See Hester Plumridge & Laurie Burkitt, GlaxoSmithKline Found Guilty of Bribery in 
China, WALL STREET J. (Sept. 19, 2014, 2:15 PM), http://www.wsj.com/articles/ 
glaxosmithkline-found-guilty-of-bribery-in-china-1411114817 [http://perma.cc/UG9Z-
7JQS]. 
 13. Id. 
 14. Adam Jourdan & Aruna Viswanatha, GSK China Consumer Healthcare Unit Linked 
to DOJ Probe in 2012, REUTERS (Sept. 9, 2014, 8:02 AM), http://www.reuters.com/ 
article/2014/09/09/us-gsk-china-corruption-exclusive-idUSKBN0H407Q20140909 [http:// 
perma.cc/K9SB-MN4F]. 
 15. See, e.g., OECD, Recommendation of the Council for Further Combating Bribery of 
Foreign Public Officials in International Business Transactions (Nov. 26, 2009); What Is 
Transparency International?, TRANSPARENCY INT’L, http://www.transparency.org/about/ 
(last visited Oct. 21, 2015) [http://perma.cc/U99H-ZAJP]. 
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Part III explores the primary policy reasons counseling against 
concurrent or successive anticorruption enforcement actions and in favor of 
a single resolution approach.  Part IV examines some arguably more 
structured approaches that have been adopted to address overlapping 
jurisdiction in other contexts, both international and domestic.  Finally, this 
Article concludes by proposing some general policy recommendations and 
guidelines that might help mitigate the risks and potential adverse effects 
present in today’s globalized, multinational enforcement regime. 
I.  MULTIJURISDICTIONAL ANTIBRIBERY ENFORCEMENT:  
A PRIMER 
Laws prohibiting foreign bribery are extraterritorial by nature, aiming to 
regulate conduct that occurs abroad, within a foreign country’s borders.  
Such laws thus invite multijurisdictional enforcement, as at least two (if not 
more) sovereign nations will typically have some interest in the alleged 
crime.  At the same time, virtually all countries have domestic bribery laws 
prohibiting bribery of local officials (and, in many cases, nongovernment 
parties).16  This part considers the various reasons why multiple countries 
may seek to prosecute the same instance of bribery and provides some 
relevant examples. 
A.  Interests of Both Supply- and Demand-Side Jurisdictions 
in Enforcing Anticorruption Laws 
By its nature, any given instance of foreign bribery involves at least two 
countries:  the bribe-giver’s home country (the supply-side jurisdiction) and 
the bribe-receiver’s home country (the demand-side jurisdiction).  Several 
other jurisdictions also may have an interest in a particular action.  For 
example, a bribe may involve one or more foreign subsidiaries of a supply-
side country’s company, or perpetrators of the unlawful activity may 
include various foreign third-party companies or citizens. 
Historically, international corruption has been adjudicated primarily by 
the supply-side jurisdiction, with the United States leading the charge since 
the 1977 enactment of the FCPA.17  Supply-side countries have a self-
interest in policing those companies and individuals that fall under their 
jurisdiction.  In the United States, for example, the FCPA was passed in the 
wake of both the Watergate political scandal and an SEC report that 
revealed the prevalence of U.S. companies engaging in bribery and 
 
 16. See Homer E. Moyer, Jr., Global Overview, GETTING THE DEAL THROUGH (Mar. 10, 
2015), https://gettingthedealthrough.com/area/2/article/28825/global-overview/ [http://perma 
.cc/LQ23-SV9S]. 
 17. Brian C. Harms, Holding Public Officials Accountable in the International Realm:  
A New Multi-Layered Strategy to Combat Corruption, 33 CORNELL INT’L L.J. 159, 171 
(2000). 
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corruption overseas.18  Chief among the Act’s purposes was to restore and 
maintain U.S. integrity and credibility both at home and abroad.19 
In addition to the supply-side interest in maintaining integrity in the 
global marketplace, supply-side countries generally have an interest in 
deterring activity that harms their own economy and citizens.  Bribery is 
generally thought to undermine employee confidence in the company’s 
management and to foster an atmosphere that invites other corporate 
misconduct such as embezzlement and financial fraud.20  Once the 
misconduct becomes public, the company faces negative press and financial 
harm, which in turn harms its shareholders.  To the extent that a supply-side 
company wins business from a competitor from the same country, the 
country’s interest in fair competition for participants in its own economy is 
damaged.21  The United States and other supply-side jurisdictions thus 
believe they have an interest in making sure their corporate citizens comply 
with their laws.22 
Ensuring compliance also is an important interest for the countries whose 
public officials have been bribed.  Demand-side jurisdictions tend to be in 
the developing world, and they arguably bear the brunt of the harm caused 
by foreign corruption.  Citizens of these countries arguably suffer most 
because it is their governments that have been corrupted, their local markets 
deprived of honest competition, their national public works projects 
compromised, and their security jeopardized as ill-gotten funds are funneled 
into other criminal endeavors.23 
Demand-side jurisdictions also have a particular interest in defending 
political integrity and credibility by enforcing their own antibribery laws.  
By holding foreign companies and domestic public officials accountable for 
corruption, these countries benefit from demonstrating to the market the 
legitimacy and enforceability of their laws.  And, by maintaining a stable 
marketplace where corruption laws are enforced, demand-side countries can 
create a competition-friendly environment, which leads to their further 
economic development.24 
B.  “Carbon Copy” Prosecutions 
Given the multiplicity of parties with a potential interest in prosecuting 
any given foreign corrupt payment, it is not surprising that enforcement 
actions by multiple authorities related to the “same” bribery scheme can 
 
 18. Mike Koehler, The Story of the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, 73 OHIO ST. L.J. 930, 
932 (2012). 
 19. See U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE & SEC, A RESOURCE GUIDE TO THE U.S. FOREIGN 
CORRUPT PRACTICES ACT 2–3 (2012) [hereinafter RESOURCE GUIDE]. 
 20. Id. at 3. 
 21. See Bruce W. Klaw, A New Strategy for Preventing Bribery and Extortion in 
International Business Transactions, 49 HARV. J. LEGIS. 303, 307–08 (2012). 
 22. See id. 
 23. See Nikolaus Schuttauf, Repeal Anti-Bribery Legislation?  A Defense of Laws 
Promoting Clean Business and Transparent Governments, 46 NEW ENG. L. REV. 617, 646 
(2012). 
 24. Cf. id. 
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come in many forms.  The most basic—and for reasons explained below, 
potentially most problematic—of these is the “carbon copy” prosecution.  
This term, coined by Andrew S. Boutros and T. Markus Funk in their 
article, “Carbon Copy” Prosecutions:  A Growing Anticorruption 
Phenomenon in a Shrinking World, describes successive prosecutions by 
multiple sovereigns for the same or similar conduct.25  In the paradigmatic 
example of a “carbon copy” prosecution, a company enters into a settlement 
with one jurisdiction pursuant to which the company admits that it paid 
bribes; subsequently, it is subject to investigation, prosecution, and/or 
penalties in another jurisdiction on the basis of these admissions.26 
The main advantage for a government bringing a “carbon copy” 
prosecution is that, as the second enforcer, it can piggyback off of the 
efforts of the original jurisdiction’s prosecutors.27  This can actually 
promote anticorruption enforcement efforts, particularly in demand-side 
countries that have fewer law enforcement resources and are often less able 
to undertake an extensive investigation.28  The drawbacks of these 
prosecutions, as several scholars and practitioners have observed, is that 
such prosecutions potentially violate the principles of double jeopardy by 
imposing duplicative penalties for the same conduct.29 
Two prominent examples of duplicative cases in the FCPA context are 
the TSKJ/Bonny Island prosecutions and the Panalpina prosecutions.  In 
2010, the United States settled FCPA charges against four companies—
Kellogg, Brown & Root LLC (KBR, a Halliburton subsidiary); 
Eni/Snamprogetti Netherlands BV; JGC Corporation; and Technip, S.A. 
(collectively, “the TSKJ consortium”)—arising out of a joint venture that 
allegedly bribed Nigerian public officials in exchange for contracts to build 
liquefied natural gas facilities on Bonny Island in Nigeria.30  The DOJ and 
SEC recovered $1.5 billion in FCPA-related penalties and disgorgement 
from the TSKJ consortium.31 
Concurrently with the U.S. investigation, Nigeria’s Economic and 
Financial Crimes Commission (EFCC) also opened an investigation against 
 
 25. Andrew S. Boutros & T. Markus Funk, “Carbon Copy” Prosecutions:  A Growing 
Anticorruption Phenomenon in a Shrinking World, 2012 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 259, 269. 
 26. See id. at 271–72. 
 27. See Leah M. Trzcinski, The Impact of the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act on 
Emerging Markets:  Company Decision-Making in a Regulated World, 45 N.Y.U. J. INT’L L. 
& POL. 1201, 1215 (2013). 
 28. See id. 
 29. See id. See generally Michael P. Van Alstine, Treaty Double Jeopardy:  The OECD 
Anti-Bribery Convention and the FCPA, 73 OHIO ST. L.J. 1321 (2012). 
 30. Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Snamprogetti Netherlands B.V. Resolves 
Foreign Corrupt Practices Act Investigation and Agrees to Pay $240 Million Criminal 
Penalty (July 7, 2010) [hereinafter DOJ, Snamprogetti], http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/ 
snamprogetti-netherlands-bv-resolves-foreign-corrupt-practices-act-investigation-and-agrees 
[http://perma.cc/P6JD-QLGX]; Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, JGC Corporation 
Resolves Foreign Corrupt Practices Act Investigation and Agrees to Pay a $218.8 Million 
Criminal Penalty (Apr. 6, 2011) [hereinafter DOJ, JGC], http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/jgc-
corporation-resolves-foreign-corrupt-practices-act-investigation-and-agrees-pay-2188 
[http://perma.cc/85UB-RJ2Q]. 
 31. See DOJ, Snamprogetti, supra note 30; DOJ, JGC, supra note 30. 
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the consortium and associated persons for the same corruption scheme.32  
The Nigerian government subsequently entered into settlements with the 
four companies in exchange for approximately $126 million in fines and 
disgorgement.33  In addition, in 2011, the U.K. High Court issued to M.W. 
Kellogg Limited (MWKL), KBR’s U.K.-based wholly owned subsidiary, a 
civil recovery order for over ₤7 million (approximately $10.8 million), 
representing the amount of the “share dividends payable from profits and 
revenues generated by contracts obtained by bribery and corruption 
undertaken by MWKL’s parent company and others.”34  Additionally, in 
2014, the four consortium members agreed to pay penalties totaling $22.7 
million to the African Development Bank for bribes related to the same 
contracts.35  Finally, in July 2013, an Italian court fined Saipem SA (into 
which Snamprogetti merged in 2006) $780,000 and ordered the 
confiscation of €24.5 million (approximately $27.4 million) of assets after 
finding the company guilty of corruption in connection with the Bonny 
Island contracts.36 
The Panalpina cases in 2010 and 2011 followed a similar pattern.  In 
those actions, U.S. authorities settled allegations that the global freight 
forwarding company, Panalpina World Transport (Holding) Ltd., along 
with five oil-and-gas service companies and subsidiaries, engaged in a 
scheme to pay bribes to foreign officials in numerous jurisdictions, 
 
 32. See Trace Compendium, supra note 10 (search entry for “snamprogetti” and select 
“Eni / Snamprogetti”). 
 33. The settlement agreements with the Nigerian government are not publicly available.  
Halliburton, however, announced that it agreed to pay $35 million to settle all lawsuits and 
charges against KBR and Halliburton corporate entities and that the Nigerian government 
agreed not to bring any further criminal charges or civil claims against those entities. See 
Press Release, Halliburton, Halliburton Confirms Agreement to Settle with Fed. Gov’t of 
Nigeria (Dec. 21, 2010), http://www.halliburton.com/public/news/pubsdata/press_release/ 
2010/corpnws_12212010.html [http://perma.cc/2CDQ-59DF].  Snamprogetti allegedly 
agreed to pay $32.5 million to have all charges dropped. See UPDATE 1—Saipem Settles 
Nigeria Probe for $30 Mln, REUTERS (Dec. 20, 2010, 4:11 PM), http://uk.reuters.com/article/ 
2010/12/20/saipem-nigeria-idUKLDE6BJ1N020101220 [http://perma.cc/HN48-RVWP].  
Sources estimate that Technip and JGC paid approximately $30 million and $28.5 million in 
fines, respectively. See StAR Corruption Cases Search Center, STOLEN ASSET RECOVERY 
INITIATIVE, http://star.worldbank.org/corruption-cases/ (search entries for “Technip” and 
“JGC”) (last visited Oct. 21, 2015) [http://perma.cc/G2U8-LC4D]. 
 34. Press Release, Serious Fraud Office, MW Kellogg Ltd to Pay ₤7 Million in SFO 
High Court Action (Feb. 16, 2011), https://www.sfo.gov.uk/press-room/press-release-
archive/press-releases-2011/mw-kellogg-ltd-to-pay-7-million-in-sfo-high-court-action.aspx 
[http://perma.cc/8UCD-NS3X].  Per this press release, the decision to require restitution of 
the corruptly obtained funds was reached by the SFO “working in partnership with the US 
Department of Justice” and reflected “the finding that MWKL was used by the parent 
company and was not a willing participant in the corruption.” Id. 
 35. Press Release, African Dev. Bank Group, AfDB Charges Snamprogetti Netherlands 
B.V. US $5.7 million in Monetary Sanction for Corrupt Practices (May 28, 2014), 
http://www.afdb.org/en/news-and-events/article/afdb-charges-snamprogetti-netherlands-b-v-
us-5-7-million-in-monetary-sanction-for-corrupt-practices-13233/ [http://perma.cc/R3WC-
W4KR]. 
 36. Liam Moloney, Milan Court Finds Saipem Guilty of Nigeria Corruption, WALL 
STREET J. (July 11, 2013, 3:32 PM), http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB100014241278873 
24425204578599990427813164 [http://perma.cc/YBD5-Z7Z5]. 
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including Nigeria, on behalf of customers.37  The Panalpina defendants paid 
over $230 million in penalties and disgorgement.38  Subsequently, in early 
2011, several of the companies charged in the United States reportedly paid 
an additional $18.8 million to settle charges brought by the Nigerian EFCC 
and Attorney General’s Office based on the alleged bribery of the Nigerian 
officials.39 
Insofar as the multiple settlements in the Bonny Island and Panalpina 
cases reportedly premised liability on the same bribes paid to the same 
officials in connection with the same contracts, they represent true “carbon 
copy” prosecutions.  Publicly available information does not suggest to 
what extent, if any, the penalties imposed in one jurisdiction played a role 
in the calculation of penalties imposed by other authorities. 
These two sets of cases thus highlight fundamental issues that can arise 
when an inherently multinational crime, such as foreign bribery, is subject 
to independent enforcement by multiple sovereigns.  Namely, the cases 
illustrate the issues of (1) how to weigh the law enforcement interests of the 
various involved states against one another, and (2) how to address the 
inherent unfairness and unpredictability of a system that contains no check 
on the imposition of multiple penalties in successive enforcement actions, 
by different authorities, for the same conduct.  Which and whose interests 
should predominate in any given case?  Should authorities in demand-side 
countries ever defer to investigations and penalties collected by supply-side 
jurisdictions or jurisdictions with only a tenuous link to the conduct in 
question?  Should countries like the United States defer to foreign bribery 
investigations of non-U.S. companies conducted by the home jurisdiction or 
the demand-side jurisdiction, even when penalties imposed by those 
jurisdictions may not be viewed as sufficient to deter future misconduct or 
to disgorge ill-gotten gains? 
Not all “carbon copy” prosecutions are brought by demand-side countries 
seeking to take advantage of investigations conducted by resource-rich 
authorities abroad.  There have been a number of cases brought by U.S. 
enforcement authorities following settlements by companies with foreign 
governments for related conduct.  In nearly all of these cases, however, U.S. 
authorities reportedly accounted for penalties paid to (or, in some cases, 
anticipated to be paid to) foreign enforcement authorities by the defendant-
company when calculating monetary sanctions under settlement or plea 
agreements. 
 
 37. See Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Oil Services Companies and a Freight 
Forwarding Company Agree to Resolve Foreign Bribery Investigations and to Pay More 
than $156 Million in Criminal Penalties (Nov. 4, 2010), http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/oil-
services-companies-and-freight-forwarding-company-agree-resolve-foreign-bribery 
[http://perma.cc/3RLB-AJYJ]. 
 38. Id.  The companies agreed to pay a total of approximately $156.6 million in criminal 
penalties. Id.  In SEC actions, they paid civil disgorgement, interest, and penalties totaling 
approximately $80 million. Id. 
 39. Noble Corp. said it would pay $2.5 million; Royal Dutch Shell, $10 million; and 
Tidewater, $6.3 million. See Trace Compendium, supra note 10 (search entries for “Noble 
Corporation,” “Royal Dutch Shell,” and “Tidewater”). 
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For example, in 2014, the DOJ and SEC settled allegations that 
executives at ZAO Hewlett-Packard A.O. (“HP Russia”) created a secret 
slush fund to bribe Russian government officials.40  In its plea agreement 
with HP Russia, the DOJ identified that an anticipated payment in 
connection with an ongoing related proceeding in Germany, as well as 
payments by HP Russia’s parent company (Hewlett-Packard, Inc.) to the 
SEC, were among the factors justifying a downward departure from the 
recommended fine range.41  While the $58.8 million penalty was 
significantly less than the $87 million to $174 million fine range suggested 
by the DOJ’s calculation, the DOJ’s papers did not specify how the “credit” 
for these other penalties was determined or how it was apportioned between 
the German and SEC proceedings.42 
In 2013, Alfred C. Toepfer International (Ukraine) Ltd. (“ADM 
Ukraine”), a subsidiary of Archer-Daniels-Midland Company, pleaded 
guilty to violating the FCPA by paying bribes to Ukrainian government 
officials to obtain tax refunds.43  According to the plea agreement with the 
DOJ, ADM Ukraine received a deduction of $1,338,387 to account for a 
fine imposed by German authorities on ADM Ukraine’s direct parent 
company, Alfred C. Toepfer International GmbH, for the same conduct.44  
In a parallel action, ADM consented with the SEC to a proposed final 
judgment that required the company to pay roughly $36.5 million in 
disgorgement and prejudgment interest, without adjusting for the fine 
imposed by German authorities.45 
In 2011, Aon Corporation, a publicly traded Delaware company, entered 
into a nonprosecution agreement (NPA) with the DOJ.  The company paid a 
 
 40. See Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Hewlett-Packard Russia Agrees to Plead 
Guilty to Foreign Bribery (Apr. 9, 2014), http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/hewlett-packard-
russia-agrees-plead-guilty-foreign-bribery [http://perma.cc/6XTQ-9AU3]; Press Release, 
SEC, SEC Charges Hewlett-Packard with FCPA Violations (Apr. 9, 2014), 
http://www.sec.gov/News/PressRelease/Detail/PressRelease/1370541453075#.VPcRtflWqV
A [http://perma.cc/PHM7-U2CU]. 
 41. Plea Agreement at 16, United States v. Zao Hewlett-Packard A.O., No. CR-14-201 
(N.D. Cal. Apr. 9, 2014), http://www.justice.gov/criminal/fraud/fcpa/cases/hewlett-packard-
zao/hp-russia-plea-agreement.pdf [http://perma.cc/2SXC-DS59].  The SEC likewise applied 
a credit against its SEC disgorgement figure in its settled administrative proceeding against 
Hewlett-Packard for an administrative forfeiture undertaken by the DOJ in connection with 
the criminal resolution by Hewlett-Packard’s Mexican subsidiary. See Cease-and-Desist 
Order, In re Hewlett-Packard Co., No. 71916 (SEC Apr. 9, 2014), https://www.sec.gov/ 
litigation/admin/2014/34-71916.pdf [http://perma.cc/K9TU-LW3R]. 
 42. See SEC, supra note 40. 
 43. See Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, ADM Subsidiary Pleads Guilty to 
Conspiracy to Violate the FCPA (Dec. 20, 2013), http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/adm-
subsidiary-pleads-guilty-conspiracy-violate-foreign-corrupt-practices-act [http://perma.cc/ 
T4VC-LAMP]. 
 44. See Plea Agreement at 8, United States v. Alfred Toeffer Int’l (Ukraine) Ltd., No. 
13-cr-20062 (C.D. Ill. Dec. 23, 2013), http://www.buckleysandler.com/uploads/1082/doc/ 
Docs_9_and_9-1_Plea_and_Exhibit%28s%29_13-cr-20062_%2812-20-13%29.pdf [http:// 
perma.cc/FCP3-VA2G]. 
 45. Press Release, SEC, SEC Charges Archer-Daniels-Midland Company with FCPA 
Violations (Dec. 20, 2013), http://www.sec.gov/News/PressRelease/Detail/PressRelease/ 
1370540535139#.UrS_GPY2byA [http://perma.cc/5TGT-K68R]. 
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$1.76 million fine to resolve FCPA charges for alleged improper payments 
by Aon’s U.K. subsidiary, Aon Limited, to Costa Rican officials.46  The 
NPA cited a previous fine of £5.25 million paid by an Aon subsidiary to the 
United Kingdom’s Financial Services Authority47 (FSA) covering conduct 
in Bangladesh, Bulgaria, Indonesia, Myanmar, the United Arab Emirates, 
and Vietnam in 2009, and “the FSA’s close and continuous supervisory 
oversight over Aon Limited,” as factors informing the financial penalty and 
the DOJ’s decision not to prosecute.48  But publicly available information 
still left somewhat unclear exactly how the U.K. and U.S. authorities’ 
separate—though apparently coordinated—penalties corresponded to which 
conduct in which geographic areas.49 
In 2010, French telecommunications company Alcatel-Lucent S.A. 
(“Alcatel-Lucent”) and three of its subsidiaries entered into a deferred 
prosecution agreement (DPA) and other related agreements with the DOJ 
and paid a total of $92 million in criminal penalties and approximately 
$45.4 million in disgorgement and prejudgment interest to the SEC to settle 
a U.S. investigation into alleged illicit payments in Costa Rica, Honduras, 
Malaysia, and Taiwan.50  The DPA indicated that the fine imposed was 
appropriate given, among other things, “penalties related to the same 
conduct in Costa Rica,” referencing $10 million paid by Alcatel-Lucent 
earlier that year to settle civil claims in a corruption case brought by Costa 
Rican authorities.51  Again, it is unclear how the $10 million was factored 
into the overall DOJ penalty, which fell within the $86.5 to $173.2 million 
 
 46. Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Aon Corporation Agrees to Pay a $1.76 Million 
Criminal Penalty to Resolve Violations of the FCPA (Dec. 20, 2011), http://www.justice.gov 
/opa/pr/aon-corporation-agrees-pay-176-million-criminal-penalty-resolve-violations-foreign-
corrupt [http://perma.cc/HW2Q-Z5ZM]. 
 47. The FSA has since been restructured and replaced by the Financial Conduct 
Authority (FCA) as the primary financial regulatory body in the United Kingdom. History of 
the FCA, FCA (Jan. 28, 2015), http://www.fca.org.uk/about/history [http://perma.cc/PT7E-
PY5W]. 
 48. Memorandum from the U.S. Dep’t of Justice to Lauren A. Urgenson, Esq. 1 (Dec. 
20, 2011), http://www.justice.gov/criminal/fraud/fcpa/cases/aon/2011-12-20-aon-final-
executed-npa.pdf [http://perma.cc/V5YA-TGKS]. 
 49. See id. 
 50. Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Alcatel-Lucent S.A. and Three Subsidiaries 
Agree to Pay $92 Million to Resolve Foreign Corrupt Practices Act Investigation (Dec. 27, 
2010), http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/alcatel-lucent-sa-and-three-subsidiaries-agree-pay-92-
million-resolve-foreign-corrupt [http://perma.cc/DRS5-UGWG].  Alcatel-Lucent was 
charged with one count of violating the internal control provisions of the FCPA and one 
count of violating the books and records provisions of the FCPA. Id.  Alcatel-Lucent agreed 
to resolve the charges by entering into a DPA for a term of three years. Id.  The DOJ also 
filed criminal informations charging three subsidiaries—Alcatel-Lucent France S.A., 
Alcatel-Lucent Trade International A.G., and Alcatel Centroamerica S.A.—with conspiring 
to violate the antibribery, books and records, and internal controls provisions of the FCPA. 
Id.  Each of the three subsidiaries agreed to plead guilty to the charges. Id.  The $92 million 
penalty was imposed pursuant to the DPA with the parent company. See Deferred 
Prosecution Agreement at 7, United States v. Alcatel-Lucent, No. 10-cr-20907 (S.D. Fla. 
Feb. 22, 2011). 
 51. Deferred Prosecution Agreement, supra note 50, at 7. 
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fine range calculated by the government.52  The $10 million fine was not 
expressly taken into consideration in the SEC matter.53 
In 2004, Norwegian authorities issued penalty notices to Statoil ASA 
(“Statoil”) for approximately $3 million for trading-in-influence violations 
(a lesser charge than foreign bribery, with milder penalties under 
Norwegian law).54  Concurrent with the Norwegian investigation, the DOJ 
and SEC opened investigations into Statoil for violations of the FCPA.  
Statoil settled with both agencies in 2006.55  In light of the fine paid to 
Norwegian authorities, the DOJ reduced the ordered penalty of $10.5 
million by $3 million.56  The SEC required Statoil to pay disgorgement of 
$10.5 million, not adjusted to reflect the Norwegian penalties.57 
This “offsetting” approach somewhat reduces the problem of duplicative 
penalties, although in many cases it is unclear how the offset is calculated 
or what conduct is considered relevant.  This approach also arguably 
alleviates concerns about protecting the interests of the demand-side 
country.58  It still leaves open, however, the question of whether a single 
investigation and resolution—by one authority, or jointly with multiple 
authorities—would better promote the goals of anticorruption legislation 
and fairness to the investigated companies, particularly where those 
companies are cooperating with the relevant authorities. 
C.  Other “Me Too” Prosecutions 
As a practical matter, the enforcement picture is even more complex than 
these examples suggest.  Although it is certainly possible that the country 
where a bribe occurred and the country where the offenders reside will both 
look to exercise jurisdiction over a single matter, sometimes a single 
instance of bribery prosecuted by one country will become “the entry point 
to a much larger complex of corruption-related offenses, typically spanning 
an extended period of time and affecting multiple jurisdictions.”59  In that 
case, multiple prosecutions by different enforcement authorities may target 
 
 52. Id. 
 53. Litigation Release No. 21795, SEC, SEC Files Settled Foreign Corrupt Practices Act 
Charges Against Alcatel-Lucent, S.A. with Total Disgorgement and Criminal Fines of Over 
$137 Million (Dec. 27, 2010), https://www.sec.gov/litigation/litreleases/2010/lr21795.htm 
[http://perma.cc/RNS7-683J]. 
 54. Deferred Prosecution Agreement at 6, United States v. Statoil, ASA (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 
10, 2006). 
 55. Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, U.S. Resolves Probe Against Oil Company 
That Bribed Iranian Official (Oct. 13, 2006), http://www.justice.gov/archive/opa/pr/ 
2006/October/06_crm_700.html [http://perma.cc/G373-SAX3]. 
 56. See id.; Deferred Prosecution Agreement, supra note 54, at 14–15. 
 57. Cease-and-Desist Order, In re Statoil, ASA, No. 54599 (SEC Oct. 13, 2006).  The 
SEC presumably would argue that the lack of a civil penalty was the “credit” for penalties 
paid to the DOJ and/or Norwegian authorities, and the disgorgement is simply the return of 
ill-gotten profits.  The reality, however, is that the company ultimately paid for the same 
conduct to three different authorities. 
 58. See supra Part I.A. 
 59. JACINTA ANYANGO ODUOR ET AL., LEFT OUT OF THE BARGAIN:  SETTLEMENTS IN 
FOREIGN BRIBERY CASES AND IMPLICATIONS FOR ASSET RECOVERY 60 (2014). 
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aspects of a bribery scheme in different places or at different times.60  Thus, 
the different prosecutions may be related and may overlap to a degree, but 
may not all punish the same alleged misconduct. 
One example of this phenomenon is the investigation of Siemens AG 
(“Siemens”), which settled with both U.S. and German authorities in 
2008.61  Pursuant to the U.S. settlement, Siemens and three of its 
subsidiaries paid a total of $800 million to resolve allegations with the DOJ 
and SEC ($450 million in criminal fines to the DOJ62 and $350 million in 
disgorgement to the SEC).63  The conduct generally arose out of illegal 
payments made in Latin America, the Middle East, and Bangladesh.64  
Siemens paid approximately $569 million more to settle charges with the 
Munich Prosecutor’s office.65  The German charges involved a different set 
of corrupt acts in the medical and transportation sectors in Spain, 
Venezuela, and China.66 
Over the five years following the U.S. and German settlements, Siemens 
also resolved actions with a number of authorities in other countries, 
including:  (1) a $100 million settlement with the World Bank to resolve 
fraud allegations against a Russian affiliate of Siemens;67 (2) a $46.5 
million settlement with the Nigerian EFCC related to criminal charges 
against Siemens and its subsidiary, Siemens Ltd. Nigeria;68 (3) a €270 
million settlement with Greece to resolve multiple civil and criminal 
complaints involving bribery in the Greek telecommunications market;69 
and (4) orders by the Swiss Federal Prosecutor’s Office to forfeit $65 
million of “dirty money” related to the slush fund scandal and $10.6 million 
in profits obtained by Siemens’ Swedish subsidiary after channeling bribe 
money through Swiss accounts to win orders from a Russian gas pipeline 
project.70 
 
 60. Id. 
 61. Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Siemens AG and Three Subsidiaries Plead 
Guilty to Foreign Corrupt Practices Act Violations and Agree to Pay $450 Million in 
Combined Criminal Fines (Dec. 15, 2008), http://www.justice.gov/archive/opa/pr/2008/ 
December/08-crm-1105.html [http://perma.cc/7MSF-XCLX]. 
 62. Id.  Siemens AG agreed to pay a $448.5 million fine, and Siemens Argentina, 
Bangladesh, and Venezuela each agreed to pay a $500,000 fine. Id. 
 63. Id.; Eric Lichtblau & Carter Dougherty, Siemens to Pay $1.34 Billion in Fines, N.Y. 
TIMES (Dec. 15, 2008), http://www.nytimes.com/2008/12/16/business/worldbusiness/ 
16siemens.html [http://perma.cc/5U8B-P2UZ]. 
 64. ODUOR ET AL., supra note 59, at 132 & n.219. 
 65. Id. 
 66. Id. 
 67. Id. at 133. 
 68. See Trace Compendium, supra note 10 (search entry for “Siemens AG”). 
 69. See ODOUR ET AL., supra note 59, at 133–34. 
 70. Matthew Allen, Swiss Seize CHF60 Million Corporate Bribes, SWISSINFO.CH (Nov. 
12, 2013), http://www.swissinfo.ch/eng/slush-funds_swiss-seize-chf60-million-corporate-
bribes/37317030 [http://perma.cc/CLT3-8XV4].  Furthermore, prior to the headline-making 
settlements with U.S. and German authorities, Siemens and a subsidiary had entered into a 
plea bargain in Milan, agreeing to pay a €0.5 million fine and to give up €6.1 million of 
profit relating to contracts procured as a result of bribes paid by its executives to officials at 
state-owned Enelpower. ODOUR ET AL., supra note 59, at 132.  Also, in 2007, Siemens 
entered into a separate agreement with the Munich prosecutor’s office for $287 million to 
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In another, more recent example, the United States brought a follow-on 
prosecution of Alstom S.A. (“Alstom”), a French power and transportation 
company, and its Swiss subsidiary, Alstom Network Schweiz AG71 
(“Alstom Network”).  In 2011, Alstom Network was subject to a summary 
punishment order issued by the Swiss Office of the Attorney General for 
failing to prevent the payment of bribes to foreign public officials in Latvia, 
Malaysia, and Tunisia.72  Under that order, Alstom was sentenced to a fine 
of 2.5 million Swiss francs and a compensatory penalty of 36.4 million 
Swiss francs.73  In addition, in 2012, Alstom Network and another Alstom 
subsidiary, Alstom Hydro France, were debarred for three years under a 
negotiated resolution agreement with the World Bank, pursuant to which 
the companies acknowledged making an improper payment of €110,000 to 
an entity controlled by a former Zambian senior government official for 
consultancy services in relation to a World Bank project.74  That agreement 
also included a restitution payment by the two companies totaling 
approximately $9.5 million.75 
In connection with the related prosecution brought by U.S. authorities, in 
2014, Alstom and Alstom Network pleaded guilty and agreed to pay a 
record $772 million criminal fine to resolve charges related to a widespread 
scheme involving bribes paid to government officials in connection with 
power and transportation projects for state-owned entities in Indonesia, 
Egypt, Saudi Arabia, the Bahamas, and Taiwan.76  Alstom Grid Inc. and 
Alstom Power Inc., two U.S. subsidiaries, both entered into DPAs, 
admitting to charges that they conspired to violate the antibribery 
provisions of the FCPA.77 
The Siemens and Alstom cases both made headlines (and incurred 
record-breaking penalties) because of the scale, scope, and geographic 
reach of the wrongdoing uncovered by various enforcement authorities.  
Notably, while these cases provide examples of how several different 
enforcement authorities can conduct multiple, related bribery prosecutions, 
the various prosecutions of Siemens and Alstom appear to cover 
misconduct in different areas of the world, with little apparent overlap.78  
Without insight into the confidential negotiations behind these settlements, 
it is impossible to know in which instances, if any, various authorities took 
into consideration potential prosecutions or ongoing investigations in other 
jurisdictions, or in what cases an investigation by one authority may have 
 
settle similar claims relating to corrupt payments to foreign officials by Siemens AG’s 
Telecommunications. See U.S. Dep’t of Justice, supra note 61. 
 71. Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Alstom Pleads Guilty and Agrees to Pay $772 
Million Criminal Penalty to Resolve Foreign Bribery Charges (Dec. 22, 2014), 
http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/alstom-pleads-guilty-and-agrees-pay-772-million-criminal-
penalty-resolve-foreign-bribery [http://perma.cc/Z5ET-SM5V]. 
 72. ODUOR ET AL., supra note 59, at 105. 
 73. Id. 
 74. Id. at 107. 
 75. Id. 
 76. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, supra note 71. 
 77. Id. 
 78. See id.; see also ODUOR ET AL., supra note 59, at 105–07, 131–34. 
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spurred investigations by others that uncovered new, chargeable offenses.  
It also is unclear whether the selection of specific conduct by each 
prosecuting authority had any relation to that conduct’s relevance to, or 
impact on, each prosecuting authority’s national interests, or whether the 
division was based on horse trading (or simply happenstance). 
From the perspective of promoting efficient and just responses to 
corruption, the specter of global companies facing successive enforcement 
actions in response to separate offenses that occurred in different 
jurisdictions does not raise the same fairness concerns as true “carbon 
copy” prosecutions.  The Siemens and Alstom cases certainly prompt 
questions, however, about what companies can or should do to limit their 
anticorruption liability risks once certain corrupt conduct has been 
discovered.  These cases also raise questions about the limits of what 
enforcement authorities can do to facilitate predictability and efficiency in a 
multijurisdictional enforcement context. 
II.  CURRENT APPROACHES TO MULTIJURISDICTIONAL ENFORCEMENT 
As more countries demonstrate an aggressive willingness to pursue 
corruption cases, the possibility that multinational companies could face 
successive prosecutions and/or concurrent liability is an increasingly 
worrisome prospect.  To date, however, global authorities have largely 
managed to sidestep the problem of duplicative penalties by using one of 
several related mechanisms:  penalty offsets, coordinated settlements, or 
declinations.  This part explores how enforcement authorities have used 
these mechanisms to address overlapping jurisdiction.  While some of these 
solutions indeed mitigate concerns about unfair penalties, they do not go the 
distance in terms of providing a clear set of principles to avoid unfairness, 
duplicative investigations, and other negative impacts of multijurisdictional 
enforcement. 
A.  Offsetting Monetary Penalties 
As noted above, the DOJ (and to a lesser extent the SEC) has 
demonstrated a willingness to give “credit” to companies for monetary 
penalties paid to foreign enforcement authorities for the same or similar 
conduct.79  What is more, in several cases, U.S. authorities appear to have 
directed their investigation and charges to illegal acts and actors not 
encompassed by the earlier settlements.  In the HP Russia matter, for 
example, the U.S. authorities charged a different entity than was under 
investigation by Germany,80 and in the Aon matter, the alleged bribes were 
paid in countries that were not a part of the FSA resolution.81  Arguably, in 
these matters, the defendants were credited for penalties based on 
misconduct that was related to—but separate from—misconduct that was 
charged by U.S. authorities. 
 
 79. See supra notes 40–56 and accompanying text. 
 80. See supra note 41 and accompanying text. 
 81. See supra notes 40–56 and accompanying text. 
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The “offsetting” approach to successive enforcement actions partially 
remedies the potential unfairness to defendants of multiple penalties.  An 
example of the use of “offsets” is the Alcatel-Lucent matter, discussed 
above, in which the United States, which had an attenuated interest in a 
bribery scheme by non-U.S. companies operating internationally, partially 
offset criminal penalties by the amount of a monetary sanction paid to 
Costa Rica, a country with a more direct interest in that scheme.82  This 
offsetting approach shows the practical difficulty of determining the right 
amount to offset.  The TSKJ and Panalpina matters are also good 
examples.83  After U.S. authorities imposed substantial penalties in those 
cases, it is difficult to know how much credit, if any, the companies 
received in the subsequent Nigerian proceedings (and whether any credit 
was appropriate at all).  By utilizing an offsetting approach, Nigeria—
arguably the “victim” country—may have had no incentive to enforce its 
antibribery laws against any of these defendants. 
Even in cases where the timing and coordination is such that offsetting 
can be used effectively, crediting penalties paid in parallel proceedings only 
ameliorates the problem of duplicative penalties and proceedings.  It does 
nothing to reduce the burdens and costs associated with responding to serial 
investigations by different foreign and domestic regulators for the same 
offenses. 
Furthermore, there is no guarantee that one enforcement authority will 
reduce the penalties it imposes in acknowledgement of monetary or other 
penalties paid to other foreign enforcement authorities.  For example, in its 
2014 settlement with Alstom, the DOJ did not appear to credit penalties 
paid in the related Swiss and World Bank enforcement actions and, in fact, 
noted these settlements as evidence of Alstom’s repeated wrongdoing.84  
Arguably the Swiss and World Bank settlements addressed conduct that 
was not covered by the FCPA charges, but this has not always prevented 
the DOJ from crediting foreign sanctions in the past.85  Alstom’s reported 
lack of cooperation and failure to self-disclose its misconduct may have 
played a role in the decision by U.S. authorities not to credit those earlier 
sanctions.86  But without more visibility into the U.S. settlement process, or 
additional guidance from U.S. regulators, it is difficult to infer anything 
 
 82. See supra note 50 and accompanying text. 
 83. See supra Part I.B. 
 84. See U.S. Dep’t of Justice, supra note 71.  The JGC and Siemens cases are other 
examples.  The United States may have declined to credit JGC’s settlement with Nigeria to 
maintain consistency with its treatment of other TSKJ consortium members, which were 
subject to Nigerian penalties only after settling with U.S. authorities. See supra Part I.B.  In 
the Siemens cases, the bribes at issue in earlier actions by foreign prosecutions were not 
within the scope of the conduct charged by the United States. See supra Part I.C. 
 85. See Plea Agreement at 14, United States v. Alstom S.A., No. 14-CR-236 (D. Conn. 
Dec. 22, 2014). 
 86. Cf. id. 
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certain about the SEC’s or DOJ’s policies with respect to U.S. treatment of 
foreign antibribery settlements.87 
B.  Coordinated Actions 
A second approach that authorities with overlapping jurisdiction have 
used in past enforcement actions is to reach a “global” or simultaneous 
settlement with the offending company.  In these cases, various regulators 
appear to have coordinated their penalties (and presumably their 
investigations) by focusing either on the conduct of different corporate 
entities or on different geographic areas.  The U.S./German actions against 
Siemens, discussed above, are one example of this approach.88  Others are 
discussed below. 
In May 2013, Total S.A. (“Total”) settled FCPA charges related to illegal 
payments made through third parties to an Iranian government official to 
obtain oil and gas concessions.89  That same day, French authorities 
announced that Total and its chief executive officer, among others, would 
also face prosecution in connection with alleged bribes and kickback 
payments made to Iraqi officials in connection with the Oil-for-Food 
Program.90 
In 2011, Johnson & Johnson agreed to pay a $21.4 million penalty to 
resolve criminal FCPA charges against its subsidiary, DePuy Inc., and 
$48.6 million in disgorgement and prejudgment interest to settle related 
civil charges.91  Following a referral from the United States, the SFO 
brought charges against DePuy International Limited, the U.K.-based 
subsidiary of DePuy Inc.92  On the day the U.S. penalty was announced, the 
SFO announced that DePuy International Limited had been ordered to pay 
£4.8 million in a civil recovery action.93  The DOJ and SEC both stated in 
press releases that they reduced Johnson & Johnson’s financial penalties in 
 
 87. It bears noting that the DOJ did defer to the World Bank’s investigation insofar as it 
already led to the appointment of a corporate monitor by not requiring a second monitor if 
the company complied with its World Bank settlement monitoring. 
 88. See supra note 61 and accompanying text. 
 89. Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, French Oil & Gas Company, Total, S.A., 
Charged in the United States and France in Connection with an International Bribery 
Scheme (May 29, 2013), http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/french-oil-and-gas-company-total-
sa-charged-united-states-and-france-connection-international [http://perma.cc/V8J4-ZE5C]. 
 90. Id.; Associated Press, Total and French Officials Cleared in Iraq Oil-for-Food Case, 
N.Y. TIMES (July 8, 2013), http://www.nytimes.com/2013/07/09/business/global/total-and-
french-officials-cleared-in-iraq-oil-for-food-case.html [http://perma.cc/BD8D-LE6F]. 
 91. Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Johnson & Johnson Agrees to Pay $21.4 
Million Criminal Penalty to Resolve Foreign Corrupt Practices Act and Oil for Food 
Investigations (Apr. 8, 2011), http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/johnson-johnson-agrees-pay-
214-million-criminal-penalty-resolve-foreign-corrupt-practices-act [http://perma.cc/NX8D-
BUQQ]. 
 92. Press Release, Serious Fraud Office, DePuy International Ltd. Ordered to Pay 
£4.829 Million in Civil Recovery Order (Apr. 8, 2011), http://www.sfo.gov.uk/press-
room/press-release-archive/press-releases-2011/depuy-international-limited-ordered-to-pay-
4829-million-in-civil-recovery-order.aspx [http://perma.cc/Q84J-QKN2]. 
 93. Id. 
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light of the company’s civil penalties in the United Kingdom, although they 
did not say whether the reduction matched the initial penalty.94 
In 2010, although never charged with FCPA liability, BAE entered into 
coordinated settlements with U.S. and U.K. authorities in connection with 
suspicious payments made in several countries.95  In the U.S. actions, BAE 
pleaded guilty to charges arising out of payments to secure business in the 
Czech Republic, Hungary, and Iraq, and paid a fine of $400 million.96  That 
same day, the SFO ordered BAE to make a $47.7 million payment for the 
benefit of the people of Tanzania, the country adversely affected by BAE’s 
alleged payments to an “advisor” there.97  The publicly released papers did 
not say how, if at all, the penalties in one jurisdiction were accounted for by 
the other jurisdiction.98 
Also in 2010, the United Kingdom and the United States pursued 
criminal cases against Innospec Inc., a Delaware company, and its British 
subsidiary, Innospec Ltd.99  The United States prosecuted Innospec Inc. for 
conspiracy, foreign bribery, and books and records violations relating to 
conduct in Iraq; the SFO prosecuted Innospec Ltd. for foreign bribery with 
respect to Indonesia.100  Once again, the SFO’s case was developed as a 
result of a referral by the DOJ, and both settlements were announced on the 
same day.101  The U.S. plea agreement notes that Innospec represented that 
“its total ability to pay all enforcement agencies” was $40.2 million and, 
“[i]n light of the interests of the other enforcement agencies,” $14.1 million 
would be paid to the DOJ, $11.2 million to the SEC, $12.7 million to the 
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SFO, and $2.2 million to the Office of Foreign Assets Control.102  It did not 
explain how those amounts had been determined. 
While coordinated resolutions are certainly a step in the right direction, 
there are still many shortcomings with this approach as it is currently 
applied.  It is unclear how U.S. and foreign authorities resolve differing 
views of the facts or law, or how they decide who takes the lead on an 
investigation.  It also is unclear what a company can do to promote a 
coordinated resolution.  There is little transparency with respect to the 
circumstances under which various regulators have sought to coordinate 
their efforts to achieve a single resolution.103  In some cases, coordinated 
settlements may be the outcome of a referral of the matter from one 
authority to another; they may be the product of self-reporting to multiple 
authorities and voluntary intergovernmental cooperation;104 they may arise 
where one government lacks jurisdiction over an aspect of a transnational 
bribery scheme; or they may be the result of some combination of these 
factors.105  On a more practical level, the coordination and division of 
penalties may be a result of horse trading or comity as multiple regulators 
that have invested significant resources into the investigation seek to obtain 
something to show for it. 
Although U.S. enforcement authorities have expressed commitment to 
cooperation with international counterparts, past cooperation is no indicator 
of future cooperation.  For example, while the DOJ acknowledged 
cooperation by French investigative authorities in the Total case, the 
Alstom press release makes no reference to assistance from French law 
enforcement, despite the fact that Alstom is a major French company.106  
Moreover, while U.S. and U.K. authorities have cooperated in a number of 
recent cases, the SFO has charged two Alstom entities and a number of 
individuals independently of the U.S. settlement.107 
Moreover, cooperation and coordination between multiple authorities 
may not ultimately be tantamount to a single resolution.108  Unless the 
coordinated settlement includes all potentially interested sovereigns, there 
always is the possibility that additional countries will bring future charges 
based on the same conduct.  Indeed, where each state takes jurisdiction over 
different violations, it is possible that the “coordinating” parties will later 
bring related charges following a settlement.109  Recently, for example, 
Total disclosed that it will face trial in France on corruption charges related 
to payments in Iran, potentially implicating in its first “coordinated” action 
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 103. See, e.g., Alderman, supra note 101, at 31 n.46. 
 104. See Boutros & Funk, supra note 25, at 287–89. 
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with French authorities the precise acts the company acknowledged in its 
agreement with the DOJ.110 
In the Innospec matter, to take another example, it may be that U.S. and 
U.K. authorities did not discuss offsetting or otherwise recognize penalties 
from other jurisdictions because the conduct encompassed in each matter 
was different.111  That said, had just one jurisdiction’s enforcement 
authorities pursued all the conduct, it is likely that the total penalty to 
Innospec would have been lower.  Moreover, it is unclear why the United 
States reasonably had any more interest in the Iraqi conduct or why the 
United Kingdom had any more interest in the Indonesian conduct.  The 
level of coordination visible to the public would appear to suggest that 
major aspects of the settlement were largely a matter of practical 
accommodations between the jurisdictions, rather than any principled 
apportionment of proper enforcement authority and scope of sanctioning.112 
C.  Declinations 
A final approach that enforcement authorities have taken to the matter of 
overlapping jurisdiction is to decline to prosecute a company for a violation 
on the grounds that the company has already resolved charges brought by 
authorities of a different country for the same or similar offenses.  This 
practice has been applied in a small number of multijurisdictional cases so 
far. 
On June 15, 2015, the DOJ announced that the former CEO of PetroTiger 
Ltd. pleaded guilty to conspiring to bribe Colombian officials in the employ 
of Ecopetrol, the state-owned oil company.113  Three other former 
PetroTiger executives had already pleaded guilty, but the DOJ declined to 
prosecute the company itself, citing voluntary disclosure, cooperation, and 
remediation.114  The DOJ acknowledged the assistance of the Philippines, 
Panama, and the United Kingdom, in addition to several agencies of the 
Colombian government, but there has been no suggestion that the DOJ’s 
declination relates to any contemplated actions by these countries.115 
More recently, and perhaps more interestingly, the DOJ dropped its 
investigation of Dutch-based SBM Offshore after the company entered into 
 
 110. Tara Patel, Total Faces French Trial on Iran-Corruption Claim After U.S. Deal, 
BLOOMBERG (Nov. 26, 2014, 9:59 AM), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2014-11-
26/total-faces-french-trial-on-iran-corruption-claim-after-u-s-deal [http://perma.cc/D582-
3E5Q]. 
 111. See Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Innospec Inc. Pleads Guilty to FCPA 
Charges and Defrauding the United Nations; Admits to Violating the U.S. Embargo Against 
Cuba (Mar. 18, 2010), http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/innospec-inc-pleads-guilty-fcpa-
charges-and-defrauding-united-nations-admits-violating-us [http://perma.cc/RX6M-PTBR]; 
Serious Fraud Office, supra note 100. 
 112. See U.S. Dep’t of Justice, supra note 111. 
 113. Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Former Chief Executive Officer of Oil Services 
Company Pleads Guilty to Foreign Bribery Charge (June 15, 2015), http://www.justice.gov/ 
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a $240 million out-of-court settlement with the Dutch Public Prosecutor for 
antibribery violations in Equatorial Guinea, Angola, and Brazil.116  The 
settlement amount consisted of a $40 million fine and $200 million in 
disgorgement.117  It is tempting to assume that the record size of the Dutch 
penalty would have negated any U.S. penalties under the “offset” approach 
sometimes applied.  That said, it also is possible that the DOJ “declined” 
the case because it did not have jurisdiction or faced evidentiary hurdles. 
In 2007, Sweden’s National Corruption Unit launched an investigation 
into AB Volvo based on kickbacks the company’s subsidiaries paid to Iraqi 
officials in connection with the U.N. Oil-for-Food program—conduct that 
was also charged by the SEC and DOJ in 2008.118  Although two executives 
were found guilty of bribery in 2012, the Swedish prosecutor reportedly 
declined to demand a corporate fine because of Volvo’s payment of $19.6 
million in penalties in the United States.119 
Unfortunately, because regulators rarely disclose the rationale behind 
their decisions to forgo prosecution, there is very little basis from which to 
draw conclusions about the circumstances under which one sovereign will 
defer to another in the pursuit of corruption charges.  Moreover, there may 
be instances where an authority forgoes opening an investigation altogether 
because an investigation is already ongoing in another jurisdiction.  Absent 
public comment or other guidance from the relevant enforcement 
authorities, we can only speculate as to the considerations underlying these 
decisions.  Although declinations avoid the problem of double jeopardy, 
there is still a lack of clarity and predictability around the question of when 
authorities will deliver and on what grounds. 
Several recent actions by foreign authorities may soon shed light on this 
issue.  As discussed above, Petrobras and GSK have been involved in 
corruption scandals in Brazil and China, respectively.120  GSK paid $489 
million to settle charges in China that involved alleged physician kickbacks, 
among other things, and the company is reportedly now under investigation 
by U.S. and U.K. authorities for possible antibribery violations.121  
Similarly, Brazilian federal prosecutors have purportedly sought $1.55 
billion from six construction and engineering companies for their alleged 
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involvement in a kickback scheme at Petrobras.122  The DOJ and SEC are 
now both reportedly investigating the Petrobras matter.123  The fact that 
U.S. authorities are conducting follow-on and/or parallel investigations in 
these cases suggests that they may not be willing to back down solely on 
the basis of a strong response by a foreign enforcer.  It remains to be seen 
how U.S. authorities will treat the issue of duplicative penalties in light of 
the large amounts already sought or assessed by foreign governments. 
Identifying patterns and trends in actions like these can be difficult, and 
observers and practitioners may often be reduced to reading proverbial 
tealeaves in an attempt to map out the landscape.  Certainly, enforcers may 
have a number of different reasons or motivations behind their decisions to 
coordinate actions in any particular way.  These decisions may reflect an 
agreement or perception that the consequences already suffered may be 
sufficient to punish or deter,124 or that a foreign authority has a stronger 
interest in enforcement.125  Leniency may be based on a desire to avoid 
unintended collateral consequences, such as undue harm to innocent 
shareholders, employees, and other third parties.126  And, as illustrated in 
several examples above, less principled and more practical considerations 
may drive coordination (or “declination”) decisions in many cases.127 
Companies engaged in international business may be hard pressed to 
draw neat conclusions from such experiences in case studies that, 
ultimately, provide too little consistency and predictability.  Unable to fully 
understand—much less control—how various authorities may synchronize 
parallel actions and sanctions, companies have good reasons to prefer and 
push for single coordinated “global” settlements.  As it turns out, there are 
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good policy reasons for national governments and the international 
community to support single resolutions as well. 
III.  PRINCIPLED RESTRAINT IN A GLOBAL ANTICORRUPTION REGIME:  
POLICY REASONS FOR ENCOURAGING SINGLE RESOLUTIONS 
As the previous part illustrates, multinational enforcement authorities 
often voluntarily coordinate their actions in ways that are more or less 
reasonable (as the case may be), but there are few reliable safeguards to 
ensure that such discretion is exercised rationally, responsibly, and 
regularly.  Whenever parties reach multiple resolutions that impose multiple 
rounds of sanctions on the same actors for the same conduct, there exists a 
danger that those actors are being overly or unfairly punished and that law 
enforcement resources are not being deployed efficiently. 
Even though each jurisdiction in any given action may each have valid 
reasons to seek its respective pound of flesh, duplicative enforcement 
actions and multiple penalties may actually hinder the detection and 
deterrence of corruption.  Duplicative actions add an element of unfairness 
and unpredictability to the enforcement regime.128  Thus, they also can be 
counterproductive by discouraging parties from self-reporting and 
cooperating with enforcement authorities.129  This part examines the ways 
in which “carbon copy” and “me too” prosecutions can undermine the goals 
of anticorruption legislation. 
A.  Overdeterrence and Fundamental Unfairness 
Entirely duplicative enforcement actions and penalties seem to violate the 
principle (or at least the spirit) of double jeopardy, the notion that repeat 
prosecution is unlawful and that one defendant should not be tried twice for 
the same crime.130  That principle is deeply ingrained, in some form at least, 
in many legal systems throughout the world.131  It also is recognized by 
international law.  For example, the United Nations International Covenant 
on Civil and Political Rights, to which the vast majority of states are party, 
provides that “[n]o one shall be liable to be tried or punished again for an 
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offence for which he has already been finally convicted or acquitted in 
accordance with the law and penal procedure of each country.”132 
But the double jeopardy principle in the international context is highly 
limited in application.  It does not apply to international prosecutions by 
different national enforcement authorities because of the dual sovereignty 
doctrine exception, which provides that two sovereigns can prosecute an 
individual for a single act that violates both countries’ laws.133  This 
principle originates in the common law notion that a crime is an offense 
against a sovereign, and, therefore, a single act that violates the laws of two 
different countries constitutes two distinct offenses.134  As Justice Black has 
noted, “If double punishment is what is feared, it hurts no less for two 
‘Sovereigns’ to inflict it than for one . . . .  In each case, inescapably, a man 
is forced to face danger twice for the same conduct.”135  A company that 
finds itself subject to an enforcement action in one country may spend years 
in consecutive enforcement actions, unsure when the prosecution has truly 
rested.136  This uncertainty is precisely what the double jeopardy protection 
seeks to shield against. 
The difficulties involved in raising a double jeopardy type of defense 
were illustrated in a recent case involving the prosecution of an individual 
in connection with the Siemens matter discussed earlier.137  The defendant 
moved to dismiss the case brought against him in an Argentine court, on the 
basis that he had already been prosecuted for the same conduct in Germany 
(and ultimately reached a plea agreement with authorities there).138  But the 
Argentine court refused to dismiss the case and allowed the prosecution to 
proceed, on the basis that it “found no matching between the facts 
investigated in Germany with those being investigated in Argentina, nor 
between the private and public interests potentially at issue in each 
country.”139  Thus, as conceived, the double jeopardy principle is narrow 
enough that if courts and enforcement authorities can find some way to 
distinguish the separate proceedings, and show they are not identical, it will 
rarely be a bar to prosecution. 
In addition to being fundamentally unfair, multiple duplicative 
enforcement actions result in overdeterrence, penalizing companies more 
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harshly than is necessary to deter future misconduct.140  This is not only 
unduly harsh, but it is also a waste of resources—a waste of enforcement 
agencies’ resources in prosecuting misconduct that has already been 
adjudicated and future instances of which have already been deterred, and a 
waste of company resources in defending against another costly 
enforcement action.141 
When penalties are too high, companies will be induced to spend 
excessive amounts to monitor employees in an attempt to avoid FCPA 
violations.142  While prosecutors may question whether companies can ever 
spend too much on compliance, these excessive costs may result in 
increased costs of doing business, hindering the company’s ability to 
provide competitive pricing.143  A company might decide that, despite a 
robust compliance program, the risk of doing business in a particular 
market is too high and might opt to pull its business out of that country 
rather than risk successive enforcement actions and duplicative penalties.144  
In fact, in recent cases, including the February 2015 settlement with 
Goodyear Tire & Rubber Company, the SEC has touted divestiture of 
foreign subsidiaries responsible for corrupt conduct as a “remedial effort” 
reflected in the favorable settlement with the company.145  Similarly, in the 
November 2010 settlement with Panalpina World Transport (Holding) Ltd., 
the DOJ acknowledged the company’s termination of its operations in one 
of the countries in which misconduct had occurred as a factor in its 
agreement to a fine below the guidelines range.146 
B.  The Chilling Effect of Duplicative Enforcement Actions 
on Self-Reporting 
A final reason to avoid duplicative enforcement is the chilling effect it 
may have on self-reporting.  Companies may be less likely to self-report 
potential FCPA violations for fear of being subject to years of follow-on 
investigations, carbon copy prosecutions, and disproportionately punitive 
monetary sanctions for a single incident of bribery.  A company may be 
willing to take the risk that misconduct will remain undetected by law 
enforcement and calculate that its resources are better spent on an internal 
investigation to remedy the misconduct or on other business pursuits 
unrelated to compliance. 
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The DOJ and SEC strongly encourage companies to self-report potential 
FCPA violations.147  Both agencies identify voluntary disclosures of 
wrongdoing as being a mitigating factor in determining what charges and 
penalties are appropriate.148  Providing these incentives to self-report 
potential misconduct allows the DOJ and SEC to focus their resources on 
detecting corruption that goes unreported, allowing for a more efficient use 
of law enforcement resources.149 
Where disclosure is discretionary, companies weigh a number of factors 
in determining whether it is in their best interest to self-report a potential 
violation to the government.  Companies self-report in the hopes that doing 
so will result in a reduction in penalty and an efficient and definitive 
resolution to the FCPA concern.150  However, the benefits of voluntary 
disclosure are speculative and must be weighed against the many other 
factors laid out by the DOJ and SEC as being relevant to enforcement 
strategy.151  Add to this calculus the risk of costly follow-on investigations 
and penalties from other jurisdictions (particularly those without established 
track records in these investigations), and the perceived company benefits 
of self-reporting may diminish even further. 
IV.  COMPARATIVE ANALYSES:  PRECEDENT AND PRESCRIPTION 
There are international legal regimes that seek to bring consistency and 
best practices to global anticorruption enforcement efforts, including those 
put forward by the OECD Convention, the United Nations Convention 
Against Corruption, and the World Bank.152  But as the cases discussed 
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earlier illustrate, the challenges posed by the rising tide of multinational 
enforcement have been far from fully addressed.153  Regulators have 
arguably met with greater success in similar challenges of fostering clarity 
and coordination in other legal contexts, including in the enforcement of 
antitrust violations by authorities in different countries and in the 
enforcement of U.S. law violations by federal and state authorities with 
overlapping jurisdiction.  Even where major challenges remain in those 
contexts, they still may provide instructive examples from which the 
international anticorruption enforcement community can learn. 
A.  Coordination in Antitrust Enforcement 
In the realm of antitrust enforcement, state action—by specific 
legislation, agency action, and/or international negotiation and agreement—
has been arguably more effective in addressing the concerns posed by 
potentially duplicative prosecutions across borders and enforcement 
authorities.  Under the United States’s 1994 International Antitrust 
Enforcement Assistance Act (IAEAA), the DOJ and the Federal Trade 
Commission can negotiate specific civil and criminal antitrust multilateral 
assistance treaties (MLATs), as well as bilateral “positive comity” 
agreements, directly with other nations.154  These international agreements 
outline processes by which national authorities refer cases to one another, 
coordinate enforcement approaches, and, ideally, reduce unnecessary and 
duplicative multiple prosecutions.155 
One example of such enforcement coordination in antitrust and 
competition matters is the 1998 Positive Comity Agreement between the 
United States and the European Union156 (EU).  This treaty sets out 
procedures by which “each Party will normally avoid allocating 
enforcement resources to deal with anti-competitive activities that occur 
principally in and are directed principally towards the other Party’s 
territory,”157 though only where “the competition authorities of the other 
Party are able and prepared to examine and take effective sanctions under 
their law to deal with those activities.”158  The treaty thus clearly envisions 
a form of voluntary deference by one national enforcement authority in 
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 155. Id. 
 156. Agreement Between the Government of the United States of America and the 
European Communities on the Application of Positive Comity Principles in the Enforcement 
of Their Competition Laws, U.S.-E.U., June 4, 1998, 37 I.L.M. 1070. 
 157. Id. art. I.2(b). 
 158. Id. 
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favor of another, in the conduct of fact investigation, prosecution, and/or 
imposition of penalties. 
This is just one example showing how the United States and the EU—
major players with interests in enforcing antitrust laws and combating 
anticompetitive practices across borders—have been able to coordinate and 
establish cooperation to reduce the costs associated with duplicative 
prosecution and thereby streamline international enforcement.  While the 
treaty focuses on ceding enforcement action where the other jurisdiction is 
“able and prepared”—a condition that may be less prevalent in the 
corruption context in jurisdictions with high levels of corruption—it is 
clear, as discussed earlier, that less developed countries are finding their 
prosecutorial footing in corruption matters in recent years.159 
And even beyond the explicit legal rules and agreements that can limit 
the potential for duplicative enforcement, more informal and voluntary 
coordination by relevant authorities can also have a significant impact.  As 
one Deputy Assistant Attorney General for the Antitrust Division noted: 
A[nother] approach is the allocation of jurisdiction over conduct with 
multijurisdictional effects to one agency by another agency that also has a 
claim of jurisdiction.  This model operates on a specific case by case 
basis, and is not characterized by elaborate rules or agreements.  Rather, 
basic agreements would establish factors for the delineation of 
jurisdiction.  This approach involves deference to another agency 
perceived to have greater interests in the conduct.160 
That is to say, transnational enforcement authorities can (and often do) 
exercise their discretion to coordinate their cases and avoid the most 
duplicative prosecutions and penalties, even when not required to do so.  
This appears to be a somewhat more reliable approach in the realm of 
antitrust enforcement than in that of international anticorruption efforts.  To 
be sure, efficient coordination in international antitrust enforcement still 
requires much voluntary action and the will to cooperate effectively among 
multinational authorities.  But additional legal frameworks also encourage 
and facilitate that coordination and make it arguably less ad hoc than 
coordination in international anticorruption efforts.  It seems intuitive that 
when coordination is pursued ex ante, as a matter of public policy addressed 
by general legislation and treaties, it stands a better chance to establish 
principled guidelines than when it is pursued on a case-by-case basis, as 
enforcement authorities address particular sets of facts in real time. 
 
 159. See supra INTRODUCTION. 
 160. Andrew C. Finch, Counsel to the Assistant Att’y Gen., Antitrust Div., U.S. Dep’t of 
Justice, Speech Before the ABA Administrative Law Section Fall Meeting:  Facing the 
Challenge of Globalization:  Coordination and Cooperation Between Antitrust Enforcement 
Agencies the U.S. and E.U. (Oct. 22, 2004).  In that speech, Mr. Finch noted that “antitrust 
has arrived relatively late to the discussion of the international implications of law 
enforcement and methods to coordinate with foreign colleagues.” Id.  But international 
anticorruption enforcement has come even later to the game and could look to the experience 
of antitrust enforcement in seeking ways to create a global regime in which multinational 
enforcers work together for the public good. 
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B.  Parallel Enforcement in Domestic Cases 
Looking to domestic law enforcement policies and practices in the 
United States may offer some principles for when cooperation—and 
perhaps deference—is most appropriate.  In the United States, various 
federal and state, criminal and civil enforcement authorities often share 
overlapping authority over the same conduct.161  Among the many factors 
they consider, and are encouraged to consider, in deciding whether to bring 
criminal charges or civil or administrative actions is whether other 
authorities with concurrent jurisdiction have already imposed adequate 
penalties and what the collateral consequences of additional penalties might 
be.162 
For example, when determining whether criminal charges against an 
organization are warranted and necessary, or whether regulatory 
enforcement alone is sufficient, the DOJ will consider “the strength of the 
regulatory authority’s interest; the regulatory authority’s ability and 
willingness to take effective enforcement action; the probable sanction if 
the regulatory authority’s enforcement action is upheld; and the effect of a 
non-criminal disposition on federal law enforcement interests.”163  In 
addition, the DOJ’s policy on dual and successive prosecutions, or “Petite 
Policy,” is generally to defer criminal prosecution where the same 
underlying conduct has already formed the basis for a state criminal 
prosecution.164  Though it is under no constitutional or other legal 
obligation to decline such prosecutions, the DOJ has clearly espoused a 
prudential policy “to protect persons charged with criminal conduct from 
the burdens associated with multiple prosecutions and punishments for 
substantially the same act(s) or transaction(s), to promote efficient 
utilization of Department resources, and to promote coordination and 
cooperation between federal and state prosecutors.”165 
 
 161. To give just one especially relevant example, under the Securities Act of 1933, the 
Securities Exchange Act of 1934, the rules and regulations promulgated thereunder, and 
other federal legislation, acts constituting “securities fraud” in the United States can be 
prosecuted and sanctioned both criminally by the DOJ and civilly by the SEC. See, e.g., 
Mary Jo White, Chair, SEC, Speech:  All-Encompassing Enforcement:  The Robust Use of 
Civil and Criminal Actions to Police the Markets (Mar. 31, 2014), http://www.sec.gov/ 
News/Speech/Detail/Speech/1370541342996 [http://perma.cc/5FQ2-NBHX]; LINDA 
CHATMAN THOMSEN, DEPUTY DIR., SEC, INTERNATIONAL INSTITUTE FOR SECURITIES 
MARKET DEVELOPMENT:  2005 PROGRAM § 1.A, https://www.sec.gov/about/offices/oia/ 
oia_enforce/overviewenfor.pdf (“A [DOJ] criminal prosecution does not preclude the 
Commission from taking civil action for the same conduct, and similarly, Commission action 
does not generally preclude a subsequent [DOJ] criminal prosecution.”) 
[http://perma.cc/NV65-A6E6].  The very same acts can be (and frequently are) prosecuted 
by state attorneys general and regulatory agencies as well, depending on the law and 
administrative apparatus in the states in which they occur. See. e.g., Amanda M. Rose, State 
Enforcement of National Policy:  A Contextual Approach (with Evidence from the Securities 
Realm), 97 MINN. L. REV. 1343, 1375–86 (2013). 
 162. See, e.g., DOJ MANUAL, supra note 148, chs. 9-28.1000–.1100. 
 163. Id. cmt. to ch. 9-28.1100; see also id. chs. 9-27.240–.250. 
 164. Id. ch. 9-2.031 (entitled “Dual and Success Prosecution Policy (‘Petite Policy’)”). 
 165. Id. ch. 9-2.031(A).  The DOJ’s Petite Policy also makes clear that it applies to 
charging decisions, not to precharging investigations, and that satisfaction of the listed 
2015] CROSS-BORDER CORRUPTION ENFORCEMENT 521 
The DOJ’s domestic policies in this regard, necessarily adjusted 
somewhat, seem like a reasonable starting point for articulating 
prosecutorial guidelines when it comes to multiple, successive, or 
duplicative international enforcement of anticorruption laws.  Given the 
increase in international prosecutions, and the analytically similar double 
jeopardy issues, it would seem that the time has come to apply a double 
jeopardy principle in the international context.  It may be that factors 
similar to those outlined in the Petite Policy are already utilized informally 
by the DOJ in analyzing international corruption cases.  If so, publicizing 
such factors, and making them partially applicable to the SEC, would help 
reduce the problems identified in this Article. 
Interestingly, both the DOJ and SEC have concurrent authority to enforce 
the FCPA, and they routinely exercise it over virtually identical facts.166  
While there are differences in jurisdiction and the available remedies, in 
large part the two authorities can and often do pursue almost identical 
conduct, resulting in essentially duplicate fines.167  This issue is beyond the 
scope of this Article, but it is worth noting that many of the issues identified 
here as problematic internationally should be addressed at home as well, 
where they ought to be simpler to fix. 
CONCLUSION 
The DOJ and SEC’s actions in cooperating with foreign authorities and 
coordinating anticorruption settlements may indicate a growing (if often 
tacit and rather informal) acceptance of similar principles that U.S. 
authorities already apply more explicitly in other domestic enforcement 
matters.  However, the United States, along with all countries prosecuting 
foreign bribery, should do better in deliberately calculating and balancing 
the law enforcement interests of all jurisdictions.  As more countries pursue 
foreign bribery cases, a greater degree of clarity, predictability, and finality 
is needed to prevent the negative consequences of multijurisdictional 
enforcement. 
The United States—formerly the frontrunner in the antibribery 
movement—should take the lead in proactively promoting coordination 
among states with a shared interest in enforcement.  One approach 
suggested by the case and settlement precedents discussed in this Article is 
for the United States to outline a process under which its enforcement 
 
criteria in no way suggests that a proposed prosecution must be brought—rather, “traditional 
elements of federal prosecutorial discretion continue to apply.” Id. 
 166. See RESOURCE GUIDE, supra note 19, at 4 (“DOJ and SEC share enforcement 
authority for the FCPA’s antibribery and accounting provisions.”); see also, e.g., supra Part 
I.B–C. (discussing the HP, ADM, Alcatel-Lucent, Statoil, and Siemens cases). 
 167. See RESOURCE GUIDE, supra note 19, at 4–5.  For recommendations on how the SEC 
in particular might reduce duplication in regulatory enforcement, see U.S. CHAMBER OF 
COMMERCE CTR. FOR CAPITAL MKTS. COMPETITIVENESS, EXAMINING U.S. SECURITIES AND 
EXCHANGE COMMISSION ENFORCEMENT:  RECOMMENDATIONS ON CURRENT PROCESSES AND 
PRACTICES 28–30 (2015) (recommending greater use of memoranda of understanding with 
other enforcement authorities, both domestic and international, “to avoid ‘duplication of 
efforts, unnecessary burdens on businesses, and ensuring consistent enforcement’”). 
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agencies will refer cases of possible corruption to the relevant foreign 
authorities, similar to the general process in place in the realm of antitrust 
law.  Such an approach could be used to reward self-reporting and 
cooperation by, for example, expressly allowing cooperating companies to 
request participation by other states with an interest in the case, with an 
understanding that only the most relevant jurisdiction(s) would investigate 
and possibly prosecute wrongdoing. 
The twin goals of this approach would be to establish final liability in all 
states with a legitimate interest in the alleged conduct and to avoid the 
waste, inefficiency, and unfairness inherent in successive investigations and 
resolutions.  This approach would allow prosecutors to address head-on the 
issues of double jeopardy and associated fairness concerns; comity and 
good foreign diplomatic relations; collateral consequences to the alleged 
offender, victims, and innocent third parties; and practical issues, such as 
which authority is best positioned to enforce sanctions. 
Of course, there may be instances in which cooperation cannot be 
achieved, and authorities will default to one of the current informal 
mechanisms for addressing duplicative prosecutions.  A transparent policy 
of inviting foreign authorities to enter coordinated settlements, however, 
would have several benefits.  It would eliminate present disincentives to 
self-reporting by providing companies with some involvement in the 
process and some certainty regarding resolution.  It would promote fairness 
not only by avoiding duplicative penalties, but also by enabling defendants 
to craft a fair defense in light of the jurisdictions involved.  Finally, it would 
spare scarce investigative and prosecutorial resources. 
As demonstrated in this Article, such coordination already occurs in 
some cases.  Normalizing this type of multijurisdictional coordination may 
require a shift in policy across the OECD, and not just in the United States 
or a few other countries.  The OECD Convention’s Working Group on 
Bribery monitors member countries’ efforts to implement the goals of the 
Convention and would seem a natural forum and mechanism for facilitating 
a shift toward more effective multijurisdictional coordination. 
Even if a commitment to international coordination is an optimistic goal 
or request, there are other steps that U.S. and foreign enforcement 
authorities can take to mitigate the negative impacts of overlapping 
jurisdiction.  In particular, states should outline more explicit policy 
guidelines regarding deferral of prosecution where the same underlying 
conduct is, or could be, under investigation in multiple jurisdictions.  Akin 
to the DOJ’s Petite Policy, such guidelines could take the form of a 
“prudential policy” that imposes a higher bar than merely demonstrating 
jurisdiction for bringing (or opening) a concurrent (or follow-on) action.  
Some factors that this policy might consider are:  (1) the strength of the 
investigating/prosecuting state’s interest in the case, such as whether the 
offender is incorporated in the state or listed on one of its exchanges; (2) 
whether a prior or related investigation/prosecution addresses all offending 
conduct; and (3) whether the other prosecution(s) satisfies the demands of 
deterrence, in view of the defendant’s culpability and compliance.  More 
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clearly articulating such a policy, with a commitment to fair and principled 
multijurisdictional enforcement, would be a step in the right direction 
toward mitigating some of the potential risks and costs identified in this 
Article. 
